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LIMITS AND DANGERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION: A REVIEW ESSAY
DAVID SCHOENBROD*
INTRODUCTION
Allan Talbot's Settling Things' evaluates the work of a would-be
new profession, 2 mediation of environmental disputes, and finds it
good. Talbot concludes that mediation can resolve a broad array of
environmental conflicts more quickly and enduringly than can litiga-
tion. 3 He recommends that government and foundations promote
environmental mediation through funding and by pressuring adver-
saries to participate in the mediation process.
4
Talbot's view, I will argue, fails to recognize that our environ-
mental statutes do not permit speedy or final adjudication of disputes
because they involve too many steps and leave too many hard issues
unresolved.5 Since litigators have ample opportunity to forestall deci-
sions in the legal process, the fear of an unfavorable final judgment
generally fails to motivate extralegal resolution. Usually at least one
party to an environmental dispute prefers delay to compromise and
has no incentive to negotiate a compromise. Talbot's recommendation
would resolve few additional disputes unless his notion of pressuring
parties to engage in mediation includes use of official, legal power to
force parties to accept mediated results.
Environmental mediation appeals to some corporations, founda-
tions, and environmental groups because of their understandable frus-
tration with the delays and expense of conventional environmental
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., 1963, Yale University; B. Phil.,
1965, Oxford University; LL.B., 1968, Yale University.
The author wishes to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of David Frazer, a
second year student at New York University School of Law.
I A. Talbot, Settling Things (1983) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
One case study that Talbot analyzes is the settlement of the Hudson River power contro-
versy. Pp. 7-26; see text accompanying notes 49-54, 70-76 infra. As an organizer and moderator
pf a conference of parties to the controversy held at New York University School of Law on
December 21, 1981, I worked on an evaluation of that settlement. See note 51 infra. Prior to that
time, I was an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, which represented one of the
parties to the Hudson River dispute. Except for a single court appearance, however, I did not
work on that dispute as a practitioner.
' See Fanning, The World's Newest Profession, Environment, Sept. 1979, at 33.
3 P. 100. See generally pp. 91-101.
4 See pp. 91-93 (need for pressure) id. at 100-01 (need for funding).
See text accompanying notes 41-44, 92-93 infra.
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litigation." It is also a subject of scholarly inquiry, 7 which reflects the
growing interest in "alternative dispute resolution" techniques for all
sorts of disputes.8 Environmental mediation groups have formed, re-
ceived foundation grants, and been asked to mediate cases.9 Talbot
attempts to determine how well environmental mediation has worked
in practice. His positive assessment of environmental mediation is
likely to be influential, both because of his accessible writing style and
because of his position as a highly respected observer of environmental
affairs.' 0
Talbot's Settling Things is, however, more than just one individ-
ual's opinion. It carries the weight of powerful institutions. The Ford
Foundation and the Conservation Foundation sponsored and pub-
lished Talbot's research." The Ford Foundation funded many of the
mediation experiments that Talbot evaluates;' 2 the foreword, written
by the President of the Conservation Foundation, endorses mediation
even more enthusiastically than does Talbot.13 The foreword also
notes that the Rockefeller Foundation and other institutions provide
additional financial support for mediation.1
4
In the past, these institutions have funded environmental litiga-
tion.15 Because they are opinion leaders, they may influence other
b See Shabecoff, Mediating, Not Suing, Over the Environment, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1983,
at E16, col. 1.
See, e.g., Environmental Mediation (L. Lake ed. 1980); S. Mernitz, Mediation of Envi-
ronmental Disputes (1980); Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute
Resolution, 9 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 311 (1980); see also Phillips & Piazza, The Role of
Mediation in Public Interest Disputes, 34 Hastings L.J. 1231 (1983).
, See J. Auerbach, Justice Without Law? (1983); R. Fisher & W. Ury, Getting to Yes
(1981); Bok, The President's Report to the Harvard University Board of Overseers (1981-1982)
(on file at New York University Law Review). Chief Justice Burger has added his voice to the
increasing calls for the use of such techniques. See W. Burger, Remarks at Midyear Meeting of
American Bar Association 16-17 (Feb. 12, 1984) (available from offices of the United States
Supreme Court).
9 These organizations include the Center for Environmental Conflict Resolution
(RESOLVE) (affiliated with the Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C.), and The Offic-
of Environmental Mediation (Seattle, Wash.), and The Environmental Mediation Service (Nor-
folk, Va.). For an exhaustive listing of such groups, see Susskind, Environmental Mediation and
the Accountability Problem, 6 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 1 n.1 (1981).
I' Talbot wrote, among other works, a well-received account of the ongoing struggle bc.
tween environmentalists and utility companies over the future of the Hudson River. A. Talbot,
Power Along the Hudson (1972).
11 See pp. viii-ix (describing Ford and Conservation Foundation support for Talbot's rc.
search).
12 See, e.g., pp. 31, 47, 71 (mediation funded by Ford Foundation).
P3 p. vii-ix (foreword by William K. Reilly).
14 Pp. viiiX.
Is See Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of justice 227 (1976).
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foundations to shift their support from environmental litigation to
mediation. They may also influence government to fund mediation
and may help to legitimize efforts by agencies or judges to pressure
disputants to submit to mediation. The argument in Settling Things
requires scrutiny not just as the proposal of a thoughtful author but as
the rationale for actions of the powerful.
Talbot decided that the "fairest way" to carry out his commission
to evaluate mediation efforts "would be by example: presenting a
series of case studies."1 6 He examines six cases, involving matters such
as the location of a municipal garbage dump; 17 the operation of a
small, private hydroelectric plant;18 the design of an urban express-
way; '9 and the impact on aquatic life of a series of large electric
generating stations along the Hudson River. 20 These cases might seem
to be a random sample of environmental disputes, but they are not. In
each instance, before agreeing to take the case, the mediator, gener-
ally funded by one of Talbot's sponsors, 2 1 had examined the dispute
and determined that it had the potential for a successful resolution.
22
Talbot's hand-picked sample is not a typical cross-section of environ-
mental disputes. Indeed, this Essay will establish that his six cases are
quite atypical.
23
The case studies do allow Talbot's journalistic talents to shine.
Each study is roughly fifteen pages of easy reading, which not only
narrate the basic story of the dispute and its resolution but also
provide a flavor of what goes on among the individuals involved in
environmental litigation and mediation. A particularly charming ex-
ample involves the opposition by the people of Swansville, Maine, to a
small hydroelectric plant proposed to be built by a young couple who
had recently moved to Swansville from a big city. The newcomers
claimed to have proof that the plant could operate economically
without emptying the local reservoir each summer, but the towns-
people believed that the evidence did not exist. When mediation
revealed that the newcomers had been telling the truth, the citizenry






"1 See notes 11-12 supra.
" See, e.g., pp. 14-15 (mediator Russell Train examined circumstances of Hudson River
dispute before agreeing to mediate).
23 See text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
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betrayed them. They got over their anger, however, and, with the
help of a mediator, found it possible to make a deal with which both
sides could live.
24
Talbot's ability to recreate the experience of settling environmen-
tal disputes,2 5 together with his disarming candor about the snags that
occurred in the mediation cases he describes, convincingly suggests
that mediation was helpful in most of the six cases and did no harm in
any of them. The critical question, however, is whether the generally
positive results in these six cases justify his endorsement of greater
funding and promotion of environmental mediation. Talbot's attempt
to generalize from the case studies is flawed. As Part I will show, he
greatly overestimates the number of environmental disputes in which
mediation could produce a settlement. Moreover, as Part II discusses,
his recommended campaign to promote the use of mediation in envi-
ronmental cases may jeopardize the public interest. Part III, there-
fore, presents an alternative to mediation that avoids these dangers
while still promoting more rapid, lasting, and consensual solutions to
environmental disputes.
THE LIMITED POTENTIAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION
In my view, Talbot's claims for environmental mediation rest on
two implicit propositions: (1) until mediation became available, there
were few alternatives to litigating environmental disputes, 2 and (2)
most environmental disputes eventually become amenable to success-
ful mediation. 27 Each is wrong.
24 See pp. 41-54.
2- Apart from newspaper articles, Talbot's account depends in large part -on what the
various parties were able, or willing, to tell me." P. 4.
26 This implicit proposition appears from the cases on which Talbot chooses to focus. In each
case, ordinary litigation efforts had produced only protracted delay prior to mediation. See, e.g.,
pp. 13 (noting that Storm King project was ongoing problem for 'close to 14 years, and there was
no end in sight"); p. 29 (noting 12-year debate on Interstate 90 problem). The Conservation
Foundation's description of Talbot's book explicitly states the proposition. Conservation Founda-
tion, Catalog 10 (1983) (noting that "there were few alternatives to litigating environmental
disputes" before mediation became available).
27 This implicit proposition also appears from the eases Talbot chooses to discuss. He presents
only cases of successful environmental mediation. See pp. 95-97 (asserting that three cases were
clearly successful and that three others were at least arguably successful). Talbot mentions no
case in which the parties never attempted environmental mediation because they considered it
infeasible. Nor does he present instances where mediation stalled and ultimately failed. Talbot
notes that, although one experienced environmental mediator, Harold Bellman, believes that
only 10 % of environmental disputes can be mediated, Bellman might mean that "the remaining
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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The first proposition is wrong because most environmental dis-
putes are already resolved by either formal or informal consent. For
example, if a developer plans a project, the project invariably will
require government approval. To minimize delay in the approval
process, the developer is likely to design the project to reduce its
vulnerability to criticism from licensing agencies, at least to the extent
that the developer can ascertain an agency's potential environmental
objections. In essence, the developer's drafting of its application, often
in consultation with licensing agencies or citizen groups, is a form of
negotiation with environmental interests. If the agency or citizen
groups object to the application once it is submitted, the most likely
next step is informal discussion with a view toward placating the
objectors by modifying the application so that the objectors decide
that the development would not be worth disputing. In my experience
as an attorney for an environmental organization, I found that, be-
cause of these informal processes, only a small fraction of all the
license applications that might be opposed on environmental grounds
are actually opposed in formal proceedings.
Informal processes also resolve potential disputes about pollution
control requirements. In most cases, agencies and businesses work out
disagreements over emission limits without resort to adjudicatory pro-
ceedings. When a dispute about a development or pollution control
does go to litigation, it can be cut short by a negotiated settlement
among the parties or by a tacit concession by one side after prelimi-
nary litigation encounters. I have no data on the frequency of such
disposition of environmental cases, but my sense is that a majority of
cases are resolved short of prolonged litigation. Moreover, the cases
that are litigated usually are regarded as especially important. Envi-
ronmental groups decide that the environmental impact, precedential
value, or symbolism of the dispute justifies the expense and effort of a
contest, while opposing interests have concluded that they too have
enough at stake to make litigation worthwhile. What makes Talbot
think that these special cases, which could not be settled by informal,
voluntary negotiation, could be resolved through formal mediation?
Talbot's second implicit proposition, that mediation can success-
fully resolve most environmental disputes, is an attempt to respond to
90 percent aren't ready yet." P. 93. Talbot seems to think that such a view might be too hopeful,
but by how much he does not say. See p. 93.
Talbot's enthusiasm for environmental mediation, however, appears more restrained when
he is not writing directly under the auspices of the Conservation Foundation. See Talbot, The
Case for Environmental Mediation, The Mother Earth News, July-Aug. 1983, at 183.
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this question. Mediation has helped to resolve many protracted labor-
management conflicts. Talbot draws an analogy between labor dis-
putes and environmental disputes. 2 Talbot does mention some rea-
sons why labor-management conflicts present simpler contexts for
mediation than do environmental disputes, 29 but he does not make
clear that many environmental disputes never involve the time pres-
sure on all parties that is so critical in motivating resolution of labor-
management conflicts. 30 It makes sense for both sides of a labor dis-
pute to settle their differences short of prolonged strikes, with or
without mediation. Each side depends on the other-labor needs
management to earn a living, management needs labor to make a
profit. Each side operates under time pressure-for each day of a
strike, labor loses pay, and management loses profits.
Commentators generally view parity of power and time pres-
sure3' as necessary conditions for settlement of any type of dispute, not
just labor disputes. 32 If one side has power over the other, the indepen-
dent side can get its way without compromise. Even if there is parity
of power, if a party is not subject to time pressure, it will prefer to
wait and see what happens in court rather than to settle quickly.
33
28 Talbot begins his description of the effectiveness of mediation with a reference to the
established success of mediation in labor-management disputes. P. 1. Only at the end of the book
does he introduce some reasons for caution in drawing an analogy between labor and environ-
mental mediation. P. 91.
21 Talbot's comments on the limitations of the analogy between labor and environmental
mediation pertain mostly to the lack of clear structure in the latter:
[T]he setting for environmental mediation is more complex and less structured. There is no
contract that is about to expire. There are usually more than two parties. The issues are
measured not only in dollars and cents, but are cast also in conflicting values about how
decisions affecting natural resources should be made.
P. 91.
11 For a discussion of the importance of time pressure to successful mediation, see text
accompanying notes 31-39 infra.
31 One party may be said to have "'power" over the other when it can inflict some sort of
damage on the other, either by imposing a cost or denying a benefit. "Parity of power" may be
said to exist where both parties hold roughly equivalent ability to inflict damage on each other.
"'Time pressure" to settle exists only where one party holds some power over the other. Moreover,
time pressure connotes some sense of immediacy or time-relatedness. Time pressure exists, for
example, when a party must settle or face an immediate penalty, or when the amount of the
penalty increases over time. Conversely, power may exist and time pressure not exist, when, for
example, any penalty that may be imposed is remote in time, and the penalty will not grow with
time. Since power is a necessary condition to time pressure, the remainder of this Essay will refer
to time pressure alone.
31 See R. Fisher & W. Ury, supra note 8, at 101-10; cf. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and
Its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1982) (outlining factors that govern conscionability of con-
tracts).
33 Time pressure is not measured exclusively in terms of the financial resources or political
clout of the parties. Rather, it "depends primarily upon how attractive to each [party] is the
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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Time pressure may arise from the cost of the ongoing controversy,
such as legal fees or strike expenses, from a need to end delay of a
project, or from a desire to avoid the uncertainty of an unsettled
outcome.
For the labor dispute analogy to work, environmental disputes
must exhibit this characteristic time pressure on each of the dispu-
tants.34 Talbot writes that the "basic script" for such disputes is for
environmental groups to fight "unpopular projects by challenging
them at every stage of what became, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
an increasingly complex environmental review process at both the
state and federal level. ' '35 In addition to fighting development proj-
ects, citizen groups also try to force large enterprises to place pollution
controls on already established facilities, in which case they may
encounter prolonged resistance from the firms in administrative and
judicial tribunals. 36 The prolonged nature of these processes tends to
relieve one party of time pressure to settle. Where, for instance, the
dispute concerns a proposal to build a new facility, opponents of the
option of not reaching agreement." R. Fisher & W. Ury, supra note 8, at 106. Thus, the party
that feels more free to walk away from the negotiations is under less time pressure than its
opponent.
-" Talbot appears to recognize that lack of time pressure hinders mediation. See p. 91
("[M]ediation becomes feasible when a conflict matures to the point where the issues are clearly
defined, the various sides perceive the existence of a balance of power, and they perceive that
their objectives cannot be achieved without negotiations."). He does not acknowledge, however,
that lack of time pressure can block mediation altogether. See note 27 supra. This omission
reflects an overly optimistic assessment of environmental mediation. Indeed, Talbot's call for
creation of pressure by public agencies could be seen as an admission that time pressure must be
artificially supplied. See p. 93. Yet Talbot phrases his call for pressure from public agencies in
exclusively positive terms: "Those involved in environmental disputes need not wait passively for
the timing to be right." Id.
In addition to the lack of time pressure in environmental disputes, the labor dispute analogy
is troubling for other reasons. In a labor-management mediation, the number of parties and the
limits of any given issue are fairly clear, whereas in an environmental dispute, neither is likely to
be especially clear. For a critical assessment of the labor dispute analogy, see Susskind, supra
note 9, at 6 n.14; Susskind & Veinstein, supra note 7, at 325-33. For a general critique of the
usefulness of labor-type arbitration (as opposed to mediation) outside the labor context, see
Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 Yale L.J. 916 (1979). Getman empha-
sizes that labor arbitration involves a unique blend of equality of bargaining power, mutual
respect, and specific contract terms as a basis for bargaining. Id. at 933-34. He relies on these
observations in concluding that attempts to apply the labor arbitration model to arbitration of
dismissals of nonunion workers and to mediation of prisoners' grievances lack promise. See id. at
934-38 (workers' dismissals); p. 938-46 (prisoners' grievances).
a P. 2.
3 One aspect of the Hudson River power plant dispute, for example, involved environmental
groups' demands for the installation of cooling towers at electrical generating plants as a means
to reduce thermal pollution of the Hudson River. Pp. 8-9. For a description of the Hudson River
power plant dispute, see text accompanying notes 45-54 infra.
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project have their way as long as the licensing process continues.
Conversely, where the dispute concerns placement of pollution con-
trols on existing facilities, delay favors the firm that seeks to avoid the
controls; delay will give it a competitive advantage over firms that
have already installed the controls.
3 7
Some of the sources of time pressure in labor disputes or tort
litigation are not likely to influence environmental disputes so
strongly. One such source of time pressure is the greater expense of
confrontation rather than settlement. For a business enterprise, attor-
neys' fees in an environmental dispute are likely to be smaller, relative
to the amount at stake, than in a typical tort suit and much smaller
than the costs associated with a labor strike.3 8 For a citizen group, the
costs of litgating environmental disputes may appear prohibitive, but
the group may use the dispute as a basis for fundraising and ultimately
may receive an award of attorneys' fees.
3 9
Another typical source of pressure to settle is the fear that litiga-
tion may lead to a particularly adverse result, such as a large money
judgment against a tort defendant. This pressure of uncertainty is
undercut, however, if ordinary adjudication rarely achieves finality,'-1
as is the case with environmental disputes. For instance, Talbot notes
the many steps typically required to license a new facility.4' Similarly,
37 Cf. R. Fisher & W. Ury, supra note 8, at 106-07 (noting that existence of establishtd
alternative to negotiated agreement functions to reduce disparity of power). The Clean Air Act
§ 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1981), for example, authorizes citizen suits to enforce clean air
standards. These provisions are an attempt to put time pressure on polluters who have not tt
installed pollution controls.
3 Amendments to the Clean Air Act imposed a penalty for delayed compliance in an effort
to remedy this disparity, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 119, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. V
1981), but the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been largely unable to enforce it. See
Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. RtL.
740, 795 (1983).
39 See Remarks, Conference on Hudson River Power Settlement at New York University
School of Law (Dec. 10, 1981) (statement of Angus Macbeth, former attorney for Hudson Rix Ur
Fishermen's Association) (tape recordings of conference on file at New York University Law
Review) [hereinafter Remarks at Conference]. A recent Supreme Court decision that links thc
attorney's fee award to the plaintiffs degree of success may discourage settlement for fear of
losing a substantial portion of the fee award. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940
(1983).
40 As Martin Shapiro has explained, the success of ancient Chinese dispute resolution, which
consisted almost entirely of mediation, depended on the existence of an effective adjudicator
process. M. Shapiro, Courts 192 (1981). Because the adjudicatory process sometimes led to
draconian results, the parties resorted to mediation: "The existence of an official judicial alterna-
tive to mediation, and the capacity of the district administrator to shift at will from mediation to
law application, provided an essential corrective for the tendency to overclaim that is endemic to
mediation." Id.
41 P. 101.
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imposing pollution controls on existing facilities usually requires a
protracted, multistage process. 42 Because of the difficulty of achieving
finality under existing statutory regimes, there is often no controlling
law in environmental disputes, 43 which makes swift adjudication even
more unlikely. Moreover, environmental statutes are often amended
at intervals of several years, a shorter span than the typical duration of
the litigation.4 4 Frequent amendment creates the risk that important
legal issues will have to be relitigated under new statutory standards
before they can be resolved.
On a casual reading, the book might leave the impression that
mediation will work in most environmental disputes because it
worked in the six cases examined. The cases are, however, not repre-
sentative of most environmental disputes. Talbot's "basic script" for
protracted disputes involves a large project, such as the Storm King
hydroelectric generating plant involved in the Hudson River power
dispute, opposed by a citizen group whose only hope for countervail-
ing power is through litigation. 45 Five of the six disputes, however, do
not follow the script. Instead, they involve adversaries of roughly
equivalent political power, such as local governments opposing local
governments, 46 a small village opposing a mom-and-pop develop-
ment, 47 and an Indian tribal council opposing a rural park district. 4
Only one of the six conflicts clearly follows Talbot's basic script, and
the successful mediation in that case depended on exceptional circum-
stances that hardly demonstrate the widespread applicability of medi-
ation. That controversy involved a dispute between electrical utilities
and citizen groups over the impact of electric power generation on the
Hudson River fishery. 49 The dispute was unique, in terms of media-
tion, because both sides had something to lose from delay.
The first facet of the dispute involved Consolidated Edison's (Con
Ed) proposal to build a pumped storage hydroelectric generation
facility at Storm King Mountain, New York. 0 Environmental groups
12 See Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1059, 1082-88
(1981); Sehoenbrod, supra note 38, at 770-71.
41 See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 791-93 (describing this problem with respect to Clean
Air Act).
11 The Clean Air Act, for example, was amended five times between 1970 and 1982. See
generally Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 808-09.
45 P. 2.




The basic idea was to create an eight billion gallon reservoir, which would be filled during
off-peak electrical usage periods and discharged to generate electricity during periods of high
electrical demand. See p. 8.
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opposed the Storm King project. 51 Delays in licensing the project
served their interest by preventing the project from operating and by
increasing the cost of the project, thus making its final completion less
probable. A second facet of the controversy involved the environmen-
tal impact of oil-fired and nuclear-powered generating stations al-
ready in operation along the Hudson. Environmentalists proposed
that the utilities install cooling towers to reduce radically the quantity
of river water used to cool the plants, thereby lessening harm to river
fish. 52 Delays in the litigation of this aspect of the dispute served the
utilities' interest in gaining a reprieve from the major expense of
installing cooling towers. If either aspect of the Hudson River contro-
versy were viewed separately, only one party would feel the time
pressure necessary to motivate an early settlement. The time pressure
to settle was mutual because the controversy presented two disputes
that mirrored each other in terms of the effects of delay.
5 3
The utilities, environmental groups, and the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) signed an agreement in Decem-
ber 1980, under which the utilities abandoned the Storm King proj-
ect, agreed to operate the existing plants in ways that would reduce
harm to river fish, endowed a foundation to study the environmental
impacts of the plants on the river, and agreed to pay the environmen-
tal groups' attorneys' fees in exchange for avoiding any requirement to
build cooling towers for the existing plants. 54 The major participants
in this dispute gathered the following year to draw lessons from their
experience.5 5 The parties generally agreed that the settlement de-
pended on the time pressure felt by both sides.
The conference sought to discover why seventeen years had
passed before settlement was reached. Since mutuality of time pres-
sure existed in this controversy, and yet settlement came so late, the
case may illustrate that lack of time pressure on both sides is not the
only reason why negotiation fails. 56 Talbot briefly mentions other
-, In addition to aesthetic concerns, environmentalists claimed that the reservoir would
destroy much of the Hudson River's striped bass population. See p. 8. This dispute provoked one
of the most famous and long-lasting environmental litigations. For a chronology of the Storm
King proceedings, see The Hudson River Power Settlement 31-48 (R. Sandier & D. Schoenbrod
ed. Dec. 10, 1981) (on file at New York University Law Review).
52 pp. 8-9.
53 Remarks at Conference, supra note 39 (statement of Albert Butzel, attorney for Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference during Hudson River power plant mediation).
-4 See Hudson River Power Settlement Agreement (Dec. 19, 1980), reprinted in The Hudson
River Power Settlement, supra note 51, at 149-203.
See note 1 supra.
5 Literature on negotiations and mediation also makes this point. See R. Fisher & W. Ury,
supra note 8, at 5-18; P. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations 88-100 (1979); Gladwin, Environ-
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obstacles near the end of his book.57 He does not, however, place
enough emphasis on these limiting factors.-5 One obstacle to settle-
ment may be the fact that too many interests are represented in the
dispute. 9 Talbot mentions the Westway dispute in New York City in
which thirty groups were involved, turning efforts to mediate into
"verbal brawls." 60 This seemingly extreme example, when combined
with the successful mediation in the six case studies, leaves the reader
with the impression that involvement by an excessive number of
interests rarely impedes mediation. That impression is wrong. Envi-
ronmental disputes have broad impacts; given the diversity of interests
among and between business, labor, neighborhood, governmental,
and environmental organizations, an environmental dispute will often
become unmanageable. A large or intrusive project, such as Westway,
in a metropolitan setting is particularly likely to affect a large number
of conflicting interest groups. Representation of even fewer than
thirty interests, however, can disable negotiations. With such a
smaller number, the process still may become too ponderous to de-
velop the give-and-take and the trust on which success depends.
Twelve major interests, for example, participated in the Hudson River
negotiations."' The negotiations still took twenty months, even though
the process was pushed along by a mediator, Russell Train, former
administrator of the EPA, who provided rare prestige and skills.
Most of the other case studies Talbot discusses did not involve an
excessive number of interests. All but one were fairly small projects
situated outside major metropolitan areas. The chief players, more-
over, were governmental bodies, and the citizenry seemed content, as
far as Talbot reveals, to accept the decisions of their officials. The
single exception among these five cases involved siting an urban high-
way. The chief combatants were three local governments and a num-
mental Mediation and a Contingency Theory of Preferred Third-Party Intervention (Mar. 1982)
(Paper No. 81-13, New York University Graduate School of Business Administration) (on file at
New York University Law Review).
-7 Pp. 93-95.
" Indeed, Talbot's citation of potential limiting factors appears to have had absolutely no
impact on the enthusiastic endorsement of environmental mediation by William K. Reilly,
President of the Conservation Foundation, in his foreword to Settling Things. See pp. vii-ix.
" The key to a mediation's manageability is the number of distinct interests represented as
opposed to the number of representatives. See Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 7, at 337-38.
The number of participants may also affect the process, but to a lesser extent. See R. Fisher & W.
Ury, supra note 8, at 7-8. Environmental disputes often involve both many interests and many
representatives.
" P. 94.
" Talbot names three environmental groups, four public agencies, and five electrical utili-
ties. P. 7.
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ber of citizen organizations.6 2 The citizen groups did not participate in
the negotiations, 63 which left them the alternatives of trying to influ-
ence the negotiations from outside or challenging the result in court,
although the fait accompli of a successful settlement could have re-
duced the chances of prevailing in court.
64
Another obstacle to mediation that Talbot treats too lightly in-
volves issues that do not permit compromise. Talbot notes in passing
that negotiation is not possible if, for example, environmental groups
unequivocally oppose nuclear power or off-shore oil drilling.65 Most of
the six case studies Talbot presents did not involve absolute opposition
by environmentalists. 66 Since the cases presented are so different from
the few situations where Talbot admits that issues of principle may
block negotiation, the reader may believe that such issues are peculiar
to a few special kinds of environmental disputes. Moreover, the reader
may also believe that in these rare cases such issues prevent negotia-
tion only when the opponents take a particularly hard-line stance.
There are, however, many other reasons why a case may not
permit compromise. Much environmental litigation is brought by
national organizations to test the meaning of environmental statutes.
A settlement of the specific dispute that presents the necessary factual
context would defeat that purpose.6 7 Environmental statutes, more-
over, can force reasonable organizations to take rigid positions. The
statutes often impose inflexible commands on agencies, e.g., to protect
health regardless of costs or to issue a large number of complicated
regulations within a short period of time. 8 To insist that these laws be
carried out without compromise may be unreasonable in many cases
because the commands are unreasonable. If environmental organiza-
tions forgo the protections promised by the statute, however, they
62 Pp. 27-38.
63 Pp. 32-33.
64 Talbot explains that the environmental groups did in fact challenge the settlement in
court. P. 95.
65 p. 94.
"' In the Eau Claire, Wisconsin, dump case, for example, environmentalists did not opposc
the dump altogether but sought a more environmentally conscious design. P. 69. Similarly, in thu
Swan Lake, Maine, hydropower case, opponents were more suspicious of the developer's motives
than they were absolutely opposed to the project. P. 45.
67 Given the uncertain meaning or impact of much environmental legislation, moreo er.
environmental mediators who settle a test case could function as de facto polieymakrs. a
possibility that raises a host of serious legal concerns. See McCrory, Environmental Mediation-
Another Piece for the Puzzle, 6 Vt. L. Rev. 4, 63-64 (1981).
63 See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 759-60.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
(Vol. 58:145:3
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION
may place their interests at the mercy of administrative agencies that
the environmentalists do not trust. 9
The settlement of the Hudson River power plant dispute illus-
trates that disputants' nonnegotiable positions may prevent settlement
and that mediators have limited power to overcome this impediment.
In the early years of the Hudson River dispute, the two major aspects
of the controversy were simply not subject to compromise, Environ-
mental groups flatly opposed the Storm King project, even though
Con Ed substantially redesigned it to meet some of their objections.70
On the other hand, Con Ed believed that the project was necessary to
supply power at times of peak demand. 71 Con Ed's commitment,
however, waned as alternative sources of peak power appeared, as its
peak power needs grew less rapidly than expected, and as anticipated
construction costs rose. 72 Similarly, installation of cooling towers at
first appeared to be a nonnegotiable item for both sides. If the utilities
agreed to install the towers without making use of every conceivable
legal defense, the public utility commissions were likely to exclude the
cost of the towers from the utilities' rate bases as unnecessary ex-
penses. 73 Environmental groups, on the other hand, insisted that the
towers be constructed because data indicated that the towers were
needed to avoid obliterating, perhaps within five years, the Hudson
River as spawning ground for much of the middle Atlantic's valuable
striped bass population.74 Subsequent data, however, indicated that
damage to fish might be held to acceptable levels with much less costly
measures. 75 At the same time, the fish damage issue lost some force
" In special circumstances, for example, where environmentalists need only compromise
with a single business, concern about precedential impact may be slight, and environmentalists
may be less insistent about their seemingly absolute statutory rights.
r, Remarks at Conference, supra note 39 (statement of Charles Luce, former chairman of the
board of Con Ed).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. Ira Millstein, a senior partner at the New York law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
has noted, in this connection, that typically "the utility is insecure because it's being watched by
the public service commission. It's afraid to come to a conclusion because if it's wrong, it can be
second-guessed. It makes setting with a utility almost impossible." Bok on Lawyers: Wise
Prophet or Unjust Critic?, Legal Times, July 25, 1983, at 35, col. 2 [hereinafter Bok on
Laiyers].
71 Remarks at Conference, supra note 39 (statement of John Lawler, engineer for private
consulting firm).
75 Id. (statements of Peter Skinner, scientist at New York State Dep't of Environmental
Conservation at time of Hudson River conference; Lawrence Barnthouse, scientist at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory at time of conference).
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with the discovery that Hudson River fish were already at risk from
PCB contamination. 76 The two main aspects of the dispute, originally
nonnegotiable, thus became negotiable over time. The mediator did
not make the issues negotiable, but he did play a pivotal role in
helping the parties to seize the opportunity to settle.
II
THE DANGERS OF A CAMPAIGN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION
Although Talbot overestimates the potential for successful media-
tion in environmental disputes, he does illustrate the ways in which a
mediator can help to take advantage of opportunities for negotiation
when they appear. In the six case studies, mediators helped the parties
to see beyond their differences to the possibility of mutually beneficial
outcomes, provided opportunities for the disputants to vent their
anger in ways that furthered reconciliation, eased scheduling prob-
lems, and dealt with other administrative issues that might have
distracted the parties from substantive negotiations.77 These functions
do parallel those served by mediators in labor disputes.
Talbot also shows that environmental mediators do something
that labor mediators need not do: seek approval of the settlement from
regulatory bodies. The Hudson River power plant settlement, for
example, required acceptance by two federal agencies and by agencies
of several states that had not participated in the negotiations. 78 Talbot
demonstrates that mediators must often help to sell the deals struck by
the parties to regulators, but he fails to underscore that this function
raises important policy concerns.
The primary danger is that the settlement process will bypass the
regulatory process in which the public interest, not necessarily repre-
sented by private parties to a negotiated settlement, can be aired. The
Hudson River settlement illustrates this danger. The agreement
among the utilities and the environmental groups required approval
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, the EPA, and state public utility commissions.
These agencies' statutory mandates require that they use their license
authority to maximize the public interest.79 The agencies were also
7, Id. (statement of Ross Sandier, attorney at Natural Resources Defense Council at time of
Hudson River settlement).
77 For a particularly insightful description of one mediator's successful tactics, see pp. 86-89.
78 See pp. 23-24.
71 The New York Public Service Commission, for example, is charged with regulating utility
rates. In determining whether a utility's rates are reasonable, the commission must "take into
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variously responsible for determining whether the settlement pro-
tected the environment to the extent required by statute and for
deciding whether to pass on to ratepayers, in the form of higher utility
bills, the costs incurred by Con Ed in the abandoned Storm King
project, attorneys' fees for environmental groups paid by the utilities,
and the utilities' expenses in operating the existing power plants so as
to reduce the impact on fish. 0 The conflict between statutory man-
date and the requirements for successful settlement is apparent. If
each agency had exercised its statutory mandate independently, the
odds of them all approving the same package of provisions would have
been miniscule. To have made each agency party to the negotiation,
however, would have contravened their quasi-judicial function and,
in any event, might have enlarged the number of interests represented
to an unmanageable size. The Hudson River negotiators overcame this
obstacle by leaving most of the agencies out of the negotiations and by
then presenting them with a settlement conditioned on each of them
approving it. The settlement was hard to disapprove. The only alter-
native to approval was continued litigation, already in its seventeenth
year, with no end in sight. The proposed settlement, moreover, had
been agreed on by all parties and was vigorously advocated by the
mediator, Russell Train. 8'
In other cases, however, agency inertia and the political climate
may impede settlements with governmental agencies.82 As Ira Mill-
stein, a senior partner at the New York law firm of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, has remarked with respect to the EPA today:
[W]e can never settle certain kinds of cases. One kind involves a
government agency that's not secure, for whatever reason-per-
haps it's being attacked politically. At the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency today, you can't settle a case. You cannot, because
they will not take the responsibility. So EPA cases are being fought
over the most incredibly nonsensical things.
83
account the public health and safety consequences, and the economic consequences to ratepay-
ers, of the utility's actions." N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 66-12-a (McKinney Supp. 1982).
" In this connection, Talbot describes the utilities' vehement insistence that the environmen-
tal groups support their requests for approval from the regulatory agencies as part of the
settlement package. Pp. 23-24.
"I See Remarks of Russell E. Train to Task Force on Environmental Resources (Apr. 30,
1981) [hereinafter Train], reprinted in The Hudson River Power Settlement, supra note 51, at
17. While the regional staff of the EPA participated in the Storm King negotiations, Train
convinced EPA officials in Washington, D.C., to approve the settlement.
62 Remarks at Conference, supra note 39 (statement of Marcia Cleveland, Assistarit Attorney
General for the State of New York).
11 Bok on Lawyers, supra note 73, at 35, col. 2.
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In these cases, disputants may have to litigate rather than negotiate. If
they do negotiate, they may be tempted to invite into the negotiations
officials from governmental agencies known to be willing to compro-
mise, and to present the more adamant agencies with a fait accom-
pli.8
4
Approval of the Hudson River power plant settlement unques-
tionably served the "public interest" better than disapproval would
have. It represented a generally fair result. 85 Apart from the substan-
tive merits of the settlement, however, the process by which it was
approved did not ensure that regulators discharged their duty to
protect the public interest. In satisfying that duty, regulators could
not rely solely on the agreement among the signatory parties. Impor-
tant segments of the public, such as ratepayers, were not represented
in the negotiations, and most of the major parties had private stakes in
the outcome. The regulator must discover what result would best
serve the public interest, not simply ratify a solution over which the
public has no influence. Ironically, the first Storm King court decision
established precisely this duty. The Second Circuit instructed the
Federal Power Commission, in often-quoted words, that its "role did
not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for
adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive
active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Commission.""
Congress codified these words in the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and also sought to open the agencies' search for the
optimal solution to public scrutiny. 7 The Hudson River settlement,
by contrast, was negotiated in secret, with an embargo on public
discussion for twenty months. 88 Con Ed Chairman Charles Luce ad-
mitted that these secret negotiations were a violation, "at least in
spirit," of NEPA and other sunshine laws.89 The EPA Regional Ad-
ministrator involved with the settlement observed that the negotiators
'4 See McCrory, supra note 67, at 61-62; Train, supra note 81, at 19.
" For a highly theoretical argument that the settlement was not necessarily efficient, see
Porter, Environmental Negotiation (Sept. 1982) (Paper No. 177, University of Michigan Institute
of Public Policy Studies) (on file at New York University Law Review).
86 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
87 National Environmental Policy Act §§ 101-102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (1976).
11 See Train, supra note 81, at 15.
"I In addition, Luce stated that "some of the [administrative] agencies involved ... were
subject to sunshine laws, freedom of information laws and so forth. I don't think we violated any
of those laws because we didn't write very much. [Conferees laugh.] On the other hand, the
spirit . . . may possibly have been violated in all this." Remarks at Conference, supra note 39
(statement of Charles Luce).
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"rose above the law" to end an old dispute that could have been
"prolonged forever" because it was litigated under a statute that
"doesn't work." 90
As I noted in Part I, our inability to use statutory regimes to
achieve finality in environmental disputes is a primary cause of overly
long environmental litigation and a primary reason why such delay is
hard to avoid through negotiation. In Part III, I will suggest means by
which finality can be promoted. 91 Here, however, it is important to
recognize that a campaign to promote the use of mediation and to
pressure disputants to accept it will create several serious dangers.
First, such a campaign invites Congress to add mediation
mechanisms to badly structured and overly complicated environmen-
tal statutes rather than to correct their basic defects. Rather than
make hard choices between economic and environmental goals, Con-
gress generally prefers to leave the choices to administrators. When
administrators are unable to discover adequate direction in the envi-
ronmental statutes, Congress often reacts by engrafting onto the stat-
utes new and more complicated decisionmaking procedures instead of
clarifying the initial directives. 92 The call for governmental support of
environmental mediation 3 could give legislators a new kind of band-
aid to cover flawed statutes, one that would suggest that the problem
is not in what Congress has done, but in the unwillingness of environ-
mentalists and industrialists to compromise.
Second, mediation may undermine regulatory processes designed
to protect the public interest. For example, the protraction of the
Hudson River dispute, the prestige of the mediator, and the momen-
tum of the negotiations made it hard for agency officials to discharge
their responsibility to exercise independent judgment.
Third, pressuring parties into mediation may seriously restrict
important rights. One of the key participants in the Hudson River
settlement, Albert Butzel, emphasized that successful mediation de-
pends on "a common interest in there being a settlement." 94 Under-
estimating the reasons that prevent development of such common
interest, Talbot would substitute, in its place, governmental pressure
to settle.95 Whether placed on environmentalists or industries, pres-
Id. (statement of Charles Warren, former EPA Regional Administrator).
., See Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 803-16.
- Id. at 799-801; see text accompanying note 109 infra.
13 Other proponents of environmental mediation have also called for governmental support.
See, e.g., McCrory, supra note 67, at 68; Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 7, at 349.
" Remarks at Conference, supra note 39 (statement of Albert Butzel, attorney for Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference).
"I See p. 93.
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sure may dilute legal rights under existing statutes without a legisla-
ture or agency taking responsibility for that dilution of rights.
An example will suggest the kind of administrative power that
pressure to mediate would create. Suppose it is discovered that a
chemical plant emits a very dangerous air pollutant. The Clean Air
Act entitles people living near the plant to have the EPA Administra-
tor issue an emission standard that would protect their health and
welfare without regard to cost, and permits the agency to delay
enforcement only within narrow exceptions. 96 Mediation, however,
might produce different results than those prescribed by the Clean Air
Act. A settlement between the chemical company and the people
affected by the pollution might provide that the company abate the
health risk to a lesser extent than the statute requires in exchange for a
monetary payment to persons at risk. A settlement might even leave
some residential areas uninhabitable, with the polluting company
purchasing the homes of displaced residents. These compromises
might seem more sensible than the statutory remedy, but the EPA has
no power to impose such results on citizens. Indeed, the Clean Air Act
authorizes citizen suits against the Administrator for failure to fulfill
his statutory mandate. 97 Pressure to mediate, however, could force
citizens to accept a compromise rather than their statutory remedy,
without congressional amendment of the statute. For example, the
EPA could implicitly threaten that, if citizens refused to accept a
mediated solution, the EPA would delay or limit the pollution stan-
dards required by the statute. Relief from such a threat, moreover,
would be difficult, given the EPA's essentially unreviewable discretion
as to the content and timing of standards. 98
In addition to sacrificing important rights provided by environ-
mental statutes, forced mediation subjects disputants to power that is
largely unaccountable and unreviewable. One prominent advocate of
mediation maintains that mediators should consider, and even pro-
mote, the interests of unrepresented parties and the public in gen-
eral. 9 How to define these interests and set priorities among them is
far from clear even in the context of conventional administrative
decisionmaking. With forced mediation, a public official who re-
quires parties to mediate will have essentially delegated the responsi-
C Glean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. V 1981).
Id. § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
For a discussion of EPA discretion in enforcement of, for example, the Clean Air Act, see
Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 766-79.
91 See Susskind, supra note 9, at 5-8.
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bility for defining and ordering these interests to the mediator. 100
Although the mediator may attempt to remain impartial, such a
stance is seldom attainable.'10 Thus, the choice of mediator is critical.
The public official who presses mediation on disputants will not have
to conform to any standards and, most likely, will not be subject to
effective judicial review. We may not object to the exercise of such
power by officials we admire; its exercise by an EPA Administrator or
Secretary of the Interior whom we distrust would be troubling.
III
AN ALTERNATIVE TO MEDIATION
Because the value of Talbot's proposals for environmental media-
tion is, at best, limited, there remains the need to solve the important
problem that mediation seeks to address: the inability of existing law
to decide many environmental disputes with reasonable dispatch and
finality. Commentators who advocate alternative dispute resolution
look to informal or unofficial decisionmaking processes such as negoti-
ation, mediation, arbitration, or private tribunals.10 2 They seek alter-
natives to adjudication, which in most cases is the process by which
private disputes are resolved. The environmental mediation move-
ment employs this approach with respect to public environmental
disputes. For environmental disputes, however, administrative or ju-
dicial adjudication is not the only, or even the primary, method of
dispute resolution. While much of the law applied in the adjudication
of private disputes is common law or is derived from common-law
principles, environmental disputes are usually decided under legisla-
tive regimes, and legislatures intervene in ongoing disputes with some
frequency. In seeking alternatives to prolonged adjudication under
existing environmental statutes, therefore, we should consider chang-
ing the legislative structures governing environmental problems.
While I do not suggest that Congress or state legislatures should
settle specific environmental disputes routinely, some disputes, such as
the Alaskan oil pipeline controversy,10 3 are of such magnitude that
,c See McCrory, supra note 67, at 61-62.
,u, See P. Gulliver, supra note 56, at 213-19; Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation,
6 Vt. L. Rev. 85, 96-106 (1981).
1112 See authorities cited in note 8 supra.
,03 The history of this dispute is laid out in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240, 241-46 (1975). Congress effectively settled the dispute by enacting legislation to grant a
permit for the pipeline. Id. at 24445.
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eventually the legislature is likely to play a decisive role. In such cases,
we should urge the legislature to play its part sooner rather than later.
As a more general solution for ordinary environmental disputes,
legislatures could restructure environmental statutes to provide rules
of conduct. For instance, an environmental statute might prohibit
industrial boilers from emitting more than a specific number of grams
of certain pollutants per unit of energy produced. Such detailed law-
making is not beyond the capability of a legislature. There is prece-
dent for legislation that sets out rules of conduct,10 4 and, more re-
cently, Congress has provided air pollution emission limits for new
cars.105 Most modern environmental legislation does not state rules of
conduct. Rather, most environmental statutes delegate this task to
agencies; agencies, not legislatures, promulgate the rules. A few stat-
utes candidly provide that they embody conflicting goals and that the
agency must reconcile them.10 6 Other statutes purport to make hard
choices, but the agency is nonetheless left to resolve conflicts.107 Al-
though these statutes fail to balance environmental and other (chiefly
economic) values by delegating responsibility, they do mandate, in
great detail, procedures that the agencies must follow in striking the
balance. 08
I have argued elsewhere that Congress could and should deal
with air pollution by legislating rules of conduct rather than by dele-
gating its responsibility to the EPA. I9 Rather than repeat those argu-
ments here, I will show why such a scheme would curtail litigation
and promote settlement.
104 See generally U.S. Pub. Health Serv., Digest of State Air Pollution Laws (1966); Chass 
Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. Cal. L. Rev. 349, 360-72 (1954).
105 Clean Air Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (Supp. V 1981).
116 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982); Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (Supp.. V 1981).
107 One example is the Clean Air Act §§ 101-327, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. V 1981). Set:
Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 751-54 (describing goals and operation of Clean Air Act). Another
example is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) §§ 101-103, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4333
(1976). The NEPA policy section, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976), is a ringing endorsement of environ-
mental objectives, but a close reading of the entire statute suggests legislative equivocation as to
goals. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 22.3, 227-28 (1980)
(holding that, in taking action, agency need not elevate environmental interests over other
interests).
'I) See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 766-79 (describing administrative complications
created by Clean Air Act).
109 See id. at 803-18. That article distinguished between statutes that delegate responsibility
for formulating rules to agencies, "'goals statutes," and statutes that directly legislate rules, -rules
statutes." Id. at 783-89. This Essay, although not employing these precise definitions, assumes
that an essential distinction between the two types of statutes can be framed.
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When rules are issued by an agency under a delegation from the
legislature, whether the agency followed statutory directives can often
be the subject of protracted litigation. For example, the section of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 at issue in the
Hudson River power plant cases ordered the EPA to establish controls
on thermal effluents and water intakes of power plants.110 The statute
permitted the EPA to issue a five-year permit for thermal discharges
only if the discharge limits specified in the permit would "assure the
protection and propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of
shellfish, fish and wildlife""' and would reflect "the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental impact. 1 1 2 The EPA
administrative hearings on whether the Hudson River power plants
required cooling towers produced sharp disagreement over the mean-
ing of this language, over how to balance economic costs against
environmental benefits, and over the extent to which cooling towers
would improve the river environment.1 3 The administrative hearing
alone, with no judicial review, consumed four years and was in
progress when the cases were settled, even though the permit was for
only five years." 4 Additional five-year permits would require further
proceedings, in which new information about the river environment
and the availability of control technology would probably be consid-
ered. This statutory procedure for regulating power plants has pro-
duced, in other locales, equivalent delays and has generated much
litigation on both the procedural and substantive requirements of the
statute.15 Had Congress itself prescribed the discharge limits on
With regard to the frequent objection that Congress lacks the expertise and institutional
capability to fashion detailed rules, see id. at 807-15. Not all environmental disputes, of course,
are appropriate for legislatively fashioned rules solutions. The administration of public property,
for example, is less amenable to such rules because the government is directly involved in
management so that agency administration is probably most efficient. There may remain,
however, some scope for legislatively fashioned rules to govern official property managers.
u Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 316, 33 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976).
' Id. § 316(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
112 Id. § 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
" See The Environmenta Protection Agency Consolidated Adjudicatory Hearing: The Dif-
fering Contentions on the Operative Scientific and Legal Principles, reprinted in The Hudson
River Power Settlement, supra note 51, at 123-45.
"4 See Environmental Protection Agency Proceedings Concerning Water Withdrawal and
Thermal Discharges from All of the Plants, reprinted in The Hudson River Power Settlement,
supra note 51, at 45-48.
"' For an example of a more than four-year delay caused by differing interpretations of the
procedural and substantive requirements of § 316 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1326 (1976), see Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 307-08 (lst
Cir. 1979); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 874-75 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
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which permits would be conditioned, this step of the adjudication
process could have been avoided.
Other environmental statutes multiply this potential for delay.
The decision whether to install cooling towers on the Hudson River
power plants was confined to a single proceeding. Other statutes
divide the decision whether to place controls on particular facilities
into several proceedings. 116 In as many as six or more separate phases,
for example, the EPA formally identifies possibly dangerous pollu-
tants, gathers information about them, develops guidelines for con-
trolling that risk, and issues regulations applicable to particular
sources of the pollutant." 7 It may take so long to produce binding
controls that, before the agency announces site-specific regulations,
new information may emerge suggesting the need to retrace these
administrative steps. Meanwhile, the polluter may use this develop-
ment to argue that any regulations initially issued should not be
enforced until the agency finally determines exactly what controls to
impose.""
Prolonged litigation is almost inevitable under environmental
statutes that provide for delegated administrative regulation. The
statutes permit litigation of a wide range of genuine issues concerning
their substantive meaning and procedural operation. Since such litiga-
tion generally must be resolved before regulations are implemented,
polluters seeking to delay new controls and development opponents
seeking to delay new projects have great incentives to prosecute such
litigation. Legislative promulgation of environmental rules, by con-
trast, could not be delayed by litigation. Although rules imposed by
the legislature would be subject to interpretation, litigation over the
meaning of such rules would likely be less prolonged and difficult than
that over administrative rules. A statute that limits polluters to a
specific number of grams of pollutant per unit of energy produced, for
instance, might occasion litigation as to whether a particular source of
pollution is within the category regulated or whether the agency is
correctly measuring the pollutant. These issues, however, are much
narrower than those that would arise under a statute that delegates
authority to control air pollution with instructions to meet abstract
goals and follow complex procedures." 9 Rules imposed by the legisla-
116 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 4-6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2605 (1982); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act § 61)b), 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
117 For descriptions of the operation of the Clean Air Act, see Pederson, supra note 42, at
1082-88 (1981); Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 756-83.
118 Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 795.
11 See id. at 756-82 (criticizing Clean Air Act).
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ture thus would ease the problem of prolonged environmental disputes
both by eliminating the need for much litigation and by narrowing
litigation when it arises.
In addition to directly reducing the length and frequency of
environmental litigation, rules imposed by the legislature would also
promote settlement. The greater likelihood of achieving finality under
such rules would encourage parties to settle disputes that they might
otherwise litigate. Fear of an adverse result in litigation would help to
produce the parity of time pressure conducive to negotiation. 120 Rules
imposed by the legislature also promote settlement by providing a
clear starting point for negotiation. Since such rules directly regulate
conduct, they must be framed in concrete terms and embody compro-
mises. Disputants operating under such rules could not take diametri-
cally opposed positions on the environmental problem they face.
Rather, they would have to take the legislated compromise as a given
and begin their negotiations on the question of how best to implement
that rule. Environmental statutes that delegate, by contrast, establish
no starting point; disputants can hope for victory on every issue. They
require agencies to promulgate controls that achieve environmental
quality and that are economically and technologically realistic.1
2 '
Statutes that delegate thus suggest that compromise is not necessary
and that the agency can somehow satisfy everyone's desires. For envi-
ronmental disputants, whose interests are inherently in conflict, this
unrealistic impression is not conducive to negotiation. One of the key
attorneys in the Hudson River controversy, writing several years be-
fore the settlement of those cases, noted that the abstract and conflict-
ing goals contained in the relevant statute "are obvious causes of
confusion and disagreement.... This, together with uncertainty as
to the character and significance of environmental impact actually
caused by power plant discharges and intakes, tends to cause parties to
adhere to doctrinaire positions, making difficult the resolution of
differences."1
22
Moreover, to the extent that the legislature, in adopting statutes
that delegate, does not take a definite position on environmental
problems, disputants can always hope that an administrative decision
adverse to their interests may be reversed by legislative amendment.
. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
,.' See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 38, at 756-59 (describing conflict of goals in Clean Air
Act).
122 Berger, Thermal Discharges and Power Plant Intakes: Section 316 in Perspective, 11 Nat.
Resources Law., 305, 305 (1978).
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Parties thus have another strong incentive to delay implementation of
rules by pursuing prolonged litigation. Legislative reversals of admin-
istrative environmental rules have not been rare, although these
amendments tend not to address the rules directly but to recast the
terms of the delegation. The resulting new administrative tasks,'
2 3
however, create more opportunities for delay.
CONCLUSION
Talbot's call, in Settling Things, for increased pressure to com-
promise is well-intentioned. He would mistakenly pressure the dispu-
tants, rather than the legislature, to strike environmental compro-
mises. As this Essay suggests, it is the legislature, much more than
private parties, that has the power to effect appropriate compromise.
How can the legislature be forced to strike such compromises?
Some recent Supreme Court opinions arising under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act 24 suggest that the doctrine that prohibits
standardless delegation of legislative power may put pressure on Con-
gress to make clearer environmental choices.1 2- Political pressure
might also develop if there were broader awareness of the harm
caused by the legislature's failure to face difficult environmental is-
sues. Talbot's book will hopefully add to that pressure by emphasizing
the harm done by prolonged environmental litigation, even though his
proposal will not solve the problem.
123 For example, the 1974 amendments to the Clean Air Act § 110, see Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 4, 88 Stat. 256 (codified a:
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(2)(B)-(D) (Supp. V 1981)), passed in response to the EPA',
mandate of automobile parking regulations as a pollution control device, did not resoll e the
policy dilemma that gave rise to the regulations, but merely precluded the EPA from using a
particular means to achieve the Act's lofty goals. Later amendments to the Clean Air Act § 172.
see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, tit. I, § 129(b). 91 Stat. 746,
amended by Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14(a)(55), (56), 91 Stat. 1402 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7502 (Supp. V 1981)), similarly avoided difficult policy choices by simply extending
deadlines for meeting then-unattainable air quality standards.
124 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-41 (1980)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
1I hope in a subsequent article to propose a reformulation of the delegation doctrine that
will circumvent the result orientation that has plagued it in the past.
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